In this paper, attention is shifted to results achieved in the development of a second type of international affairs indicators. These indicators are representations of country characteristics selected because of their relevance to national security matters. Country characteristics refer here to phenomena that are significant in international affairs but that, for present purposes, do not directly relate to interaction among countries, That is, characteristics indicators focus on the individual country as the unit of analysis. The term event-interaction was coined by Professor Charles McClelland, director of the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project at t ■ University of Southern California. Eventinterav tions between countries are defined as actions and responses that are both official (i.e., initiated and received by governmental representatives) and non-routine (i.e., of sufficient importance so that they attract attention and are reported). Event-interaction data consist ci chronologies of such actions and responses, both in coded (numerical) form and in summary English language descriptive form.
For an overview of international affairs indicator development based on event-interaction data, see Theodore J. To assist in the interpretation of indicators of international interaction. For example, two pairs of countries may manifest the same value of relations (R), the quality of their interaction (i.e., R " = R_ ^); but A and B may be "superpowers" while C and D may be less developed countries. The presence of characteristics information should permit the user to distinguish quantitatively between country paL s in kind as well as b^ behavior, thereby broadening the basis for meaningful interpretation.
To identify countries in "interesting" stater of change relative to national security concerns. Changes in some characteristics may occur gradually and almost imperceptibly; other characteristics changes maybe more rapid and prcr »nnced. The ability to compare changes in characteristics among countries, within regions, or within conflict arenas should prove valuable. For example, if a nation located in a region of easing international tensions increases its emphasis on military preparedness, that characteristic takes on added significance.
To identify characteristics profiles for types of countries that are important from a national security standpoint. For example, if one were to derive a profile of the characteristics of all geographically adjacent country pairs that have engaged in armed conflict recently, then one might seek current analogues among other adjacent country pairs as a possible means to anticipate the potential for new armed conflicts. i
III. DEVELOPMENT OF CHARACTERISTICS INDICATORS
By "noticeably" we mean tl at its actions are non-routine and therefore attract attention and are reported by observers.
-------------- A by the WEIS Project at the University of Southern California . Presently this collection is being maintained by C.A.C.I. on a current basis using the same source.
Details about data usage are r-ported in the foil owing two sections.
,: -THE CHARACTERISTICS TNDTrATnpc; It may be see-, la Ta.hle 2 that various transformations have been applied to the measurement of the composite characteristics indicators. The root transformations have been employed to permit more meaningful mterpretatior of value changes over time. For extuvple, the power indicator is measure! as the product of four quantities. If each of these quantities were to double from one period to another, then their untransformed product would increase by a factor of 16 (2 x 2 x 2 x 2) suggesting a sixteenfold increase in power. However, a more reasonable interpretation of inch a change would be that power had doubled. This can be represented by taking the fourth root of the product, since ^fH . 2.
I
The scaling transformations have been employed to eliminate the inconvenience of small indicator values. For example, in transformed 
•mm****- A complete list of the 82 countries for which data exist in computerized files appears in Appendix A. In addition to the calendar year values for each indicator, the data files contain an index computed to monitor changes over time. The index values are computed using the average of the first two years' indicator values (either 1961-1962 or 1966-1967) as the base period. The basevalue for each indicator is then divided into each year of data to obtain the index value for that year.
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IV. ILLUSTRATIONS OF COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS INDICATORS

■
The two issues which must be addressed with respect to the country characteristics indicators relate to their validity and utility. The illustrations that follow will attempt to bear on both issues while acquainting the reader with the substance of the indicators. For most illustrations, attention will be focused on the composite i-idicators, that is, those that are most highly ag negated and, therefore, most economical in conveying information.
A. SELECTED COUNTRY RANKINGS, 1970 
J ' ■'■
, "^" ■■■■■Mm indicator, the U.S., USSR, and China, with their enormous power, tend to rank low despite hi^h levels of international participation. The U.S., for exan-.plt even with its intense Southeast Asian involvement, manifests stress only slightly higher than the worldwide median, while stress in the USSR and China lie below the median.
B. CHANGES IN CHARACTERISTICS OVER TIME
The rankings discussed above are a static representation of 1970 country characteristics. Of perhaps greater importance are representations of change. For this purpose we employ the index values referred to earlier and focus on selected examples where these indices depict inte-esting and related states of change. Again we will, however, limit attention to the three composite characteristics indicators;
power, emphasis, and stress.
Figures 1A-1C depict the change over time in power, emphasis, and stress, respectively, for the U.S., USSR, and China. Figure 1A indicates that China's power growth during the 1960^ was at a higher rate than that of either of the "superpowers." Similarly, Figure IB depicts for China the highest rate of growth in emphasis over the period. All of this latter increase, however, occurred between i96Z and 1964 and has since merely been sustained. Emphasis for the USSR was virtually constant over the decade while that for the U.S. increased during the mid-60 , s and then declined to its earlier level. The genera] uniformity among the U.S., USSR, and China in power and emphasis changes was in sharp contrast to the stress indices in Figure 1C where the three countries In Figures 3A and 3B , the arms race following the 19^7 Middle East War is evidenced by Israel's growing power and emphasis, while those characteristicp of the UAR rose more steeply just prior to the war and have subsequently remained at high levels. Figure 3C depicts the increasing stress on both countries during the war year and after 1968 as tension built up again in the area.
In effect, these Southeast Asia and Middle East examples illustrate the phenomenon (since 1969) of major pcwcx-conflict by proxy, in terms of impacts on the characteristics of the participants.
C. REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Viewing indicators regionally rather than worldwide permits the user to focus on the characteristics of more localized situations which are of continuing interest. (fl 1970 Emphasis. Virtually all the countries lie above the samplewide mediar for emphasis. However, those NATO countries substantially higher in emphasis than the median (Portugal and Greece) were involved in internal conflict situations. Their emphasis may be presumed to have an internal, rather than a Cold War orientation.
1970 Stress. Only four NATO countries and one Warsaw Pact country manifested a stress level higher than the samplewide median. Within NATO, Portugal's stress was associated with its war in Africa.
1961-1970 Power Change. Only five of the 18 countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact exceeded the samplewide median power increase over the decade of the 1960^. Three of these (Portugal, Norway, and
Hungary) were still small regional powers by 1970 despite their relatively high growth rates over the decade.
1961-1970 Emphasis Charge. Not only did 11 of the 18 countries exhibit changes in emphasis lower than the samplewide median for this indicator, but 14 of the 18 actually showed a net decline in emphasis (index value 2 1.00). Among NATO countries, only Portugal and Greece, each with previously mentioned internal security problems, increased in emphasis over the decade.
1966-1970 Stress Change. Fifteen of the 18 countries showed a net decline in stress during the 1960 , s, pointing to a general easing of Cold War tensions. Two of the three countries running counter to this trend are East and West Germany, whose differences have been among the last and most difficult to reconcile in the detente. includes countries other than NA10 members, but for purposes of this illustration, the two may be considered the ^ame. In this instance, we see the steadily positive relationship between the U.S. and its "partners.
We also see the reconciliation between these countries and the USSR subsequent to the Chechoslovakian crisis. Although complicated by the Czechoslovakian affair, all the relationships illustrated suggest a general trend toward East-West detente.
Of more pertinence here is the idea that the characteristics and behavioral indicators can be used together to provide multidimensional views of worldwide or regional trends.
D -ANTICIPATING FUTURE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
To the extent that international affairs indicators satisfactorily represent past and p-esent phenomena, they provide information that is
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Returning to Figure 5 , we see that the increases in East German em- In Figure 4C we saw the extent to which overall USSR-Warsaw Pact relations were negatively affected by the Czechoslovakian Crisis. That between the USSR and East Germany. Here we see the minimal degree to which these relations were disturbed by that crisis. We see further the constancy of friendly relations between the pair over the entire period. We might choose, therefore, to interpret this as an illustration of East German political loyalty and reliability vis-a-vis Soviet interests and policy.
The scenario which was postulated at the outset may now be projected forward in time in a manner consistent with the inferences drawn from these few indicator displays:
'
The buildup of military power in East Germany will permit the USSR to promote and accept some reduction of foreign military presence in Central Europe, including its own, and thereby permit it to continue to shift its military attention tc its Eastern frontier. In the Soviet view, a politically reliable and mili'.arily strong East Germany will provide a barrier to the growth of Western influence in East Eur^zzr. affairs. East Germany, having been selected for this role, wi:i become an increasingly important factor in future European and East-West affairs.
Together, the indicators cited offer consistent support to the scenario set forth above. That scenario may prove in time to be either accurate or inaccurate. What is important here is the idea that a family of international affairs indicators can contribute relevant information to the anticipation of future developments at a time when the art of anticipation can certainly benefit from the availability of new information tools. The initial relations value is computed for a 12 month period ending Dec. 31, 1966 . Subsequent values ire computed each 3 mentis for the preceding 12 months. deriving characteristics profiles for country types and/or conflict types of national security interest, and systematically seeking the emergence of analogues to these types over time.
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Research on "packaging" or displaying characteristics and interactional indicators in ways that enhance their utility.
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